THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY IN DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

In a democracy, legal decisions are made based on majority rule.  That is, we decided what is right or wrong by counting votes: the largest number of votes determines the outcome.  Furthermore, in the U.S., we also have a constitutional imperative to protect the rights of the individualat the same time that we insist on treating everyone as equals.  These two components of American ideology and constitutional moralityliberty and equalityare, however, not easy to safeguard or guarantee, a fact that makes deciding right from wrong, based on majority rule, inherently problematic.

If all Americans were the same, and therefore desired to exercise their individual rights in the same manner, then we would not have a conflict between equality and liberty.  e are not all the same, though, and individuals desire to define the pursuit of happiness in different ways.  We know that being equal does not mean being the same; the concept of equality is a moral one that compels us to treat each other with dignity and respect, despite difference.  How, then, do we decide when it is okay to limit one individuals rights?  If we do so based on majority rule, then can we be sure that we have made the right choice?  In other words, if I want to beat my neighbor senseless with a big stick, is that okay if, after taking a vote, I find that a majority of voters think it is okay for me to do so?

The answer to that question may seem obvious, but the answer becomes less obvious when we discuss issues like smokers rights and gay marriage.  To put it simply, there is a difference between constitutional morality and personal morality, but how do we know the difference when it comes to making laws?  In the following passage, Alexis de Tocqueville discusses the conflict between individual liberty and social equality as it relates to democracy and majority rule.  Analyze this passage and discuss his perspective in relation to this topic:

I hold it to be an impious and detestable maxim that, politically speaking, the people have a right to do anything; and yet I have asserted that all authority originates in the will of the majority.  Am I, then, in contradiction with myself? A general law, which bears the name of justice, has been made and sanctioned, not only by a majority of this or that people, but by a majority of mankind.
The rights of every people are therefore confined within the limits of what is just.  A nation may be considered as a jury which is empowered to represent society at large and to apply justice, which is its law.  Ought such a jury, which represents society, to have more power than the society itself whose laws it executes?

When I refuse to obey an unjust law, I do not contest the right of the majority to command, but I simply appeal from the sovereignty of the people to the
sovereignty of mankind.  Some have not feared to assert that a people can never outstep the boundaries of justice and reason in those affairs which are peculiarly its own; and that consequently full power may be given to the majority by which it is represented.  But this is the language of a slave. A majority taken collectively is only an individual, whose opinions, and frequently whose interests, are opposed to those of another individual, who is styled a minority.  If it be admitted that a man possessing absolute power may misuse that power by wronging his adversaries, why should not a majority be liable to the same reproach?  Men do not change their characters by uniting with one another; nor does their patience in the presence of obstacles increase with their strength.  For my own part, I cannot believe it; the power to do everything, which I should refuse to one of my equals, I will never grant to any number of them.