Critically compare Freges distinction between subject and predicate with that which Fred Sommers defends. Are there any good reasons for favouring either approach over the
other? If so, what are they? If not, why not?
Some suggested readings:
Frege, G. On Concept and Object (1892), translated in Mind, 1951,
Vol. 60,16880 (see especially 16970)
Sommers, F. The Logic of Natural Language (1982), especially Introduction,
Chapters 12, 6
Geach, P. Subject and Predicate, Mind, 1950, Vol. 59, 46182
Geach, P. History of the Corruptions of Logic (1968), reprinted in his
Logic Matters (1972)
Quine, W. V. Word and Object (1960), 20 (Predication), 33 (Aims and
Claims of Regimentation)
BenYami, H. Review of The Old New Logic, Mind, 2007, Vol. 116, 197202
(see especially 199202)
